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INCORRECT STATEMENTS OF FACT 
Throughout the Respondent's Brief, Blair and Joann Grover (Grovers) repeat several 
incorrect statements of fact. Rather than argue these assertions each time they are inserted, the 
same are summarily discussed as follows: 
1. Gaston was not Wadsworths' agent. Grovers make assertions such as "[t]hrough 
Gaston, Earl told the Grovers what the balance of the note was." (Resp't Br. 6.) This 
assertion was used to attempt to bridge the gap between Wadsworth and Grovers as to 
supposed representations made by Earl Wadsworth (Earl) to Grovers. William Porter 
Gaston (Gaston) was never the conduit of information or documents from Earl to 
Grovers related to the balance owed. Information received from Wadsworths, such as 
the 1996 statement of account may have been presented to Blair Grover (Blair) by 
Gaston, 1 but considering the circumstances,2 nothing else was done. "The burden of 
proving agency is upon the party who asserts it." Transamerica Leasing Corp. v. 
Van's Realty Co., 91 Idaho 510, 517, 427 P.2d 284,291 (1967). The record is void of 
any proof that Gaston made representations or had authority to make representations 
on Earl's behalf to Grovers. 
1 Gaston had in his possession the 1996 statement of account at the time of the 
assignment/assumption. (Resp't Br. 11.) In his paperwork, Blair used the figure $56,000.00 as 
the balance owed. This amount represents the 1996 year end declared balance. 
2 See Appellant's Br. 4, 10-11. 
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2. Grovers had the ability to determine the balance owed without reliance upon Earl's 
calculations. Grovers argue that "[t]he Grovers did not know whether there had been 
prepayments on the note, whether there had been any forgiveness of the note, or any 
other alteration of the amount owed." (Resp't Br. 6.) 1bis argument is directly 
opposite of the evidence and what Grovers constructively knew.3 Gaston specifically 
told Blair that prepayments were prohibited.4 Gaston never made any prepayment,5 
and Grovers never inquired about the same.6 Any lack of knowledge by Grovers was 
self imposed. Grovers knew the payments were expected to continue at least through 
September 2010. In his deposition, when asked ifhe understood the obligation was to 
continue payments through 2010, Blair responded, "I don't have an independent 
recollection of that, but I got to believe that I did. That's what it says." (Grover 
Dep. 38:2-4.) 
3. Norma has a sufficient foundation to testify as to amount owed. Grovers assert that 
"Norma has no knowledge of the amounts owed on the note." (Resp't Br. 7-8.) 
Although Norma did not keep any records and did not know how to amortize, she was 
3 Equitable estoppel requires the party asserting estoppel to show that they could not have 
discovered the truth. Sorensen v. St. Alphonsus Reg'! Med Ctr., Inc., 141 Idaho 754, 759, 118 
P.3d 86, 91 (2005). 
4 Blair Grover Dep. 33:8-9, 37:5-38:7, Sept. 14, 2007. 
5 William Porter Gaston Dep. 81:10-21, Sept. 14, 2007. 
6 Grover Dep. 48:23- 49:12. 
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aware of the payment history. Norma testified that no prepayments were made. She 
testified, and was competent to testify, that no payments were waived, nor were 
modifications made to the contract. (R. Vol. 1, p.106, 'l['I[ 7-8.) 
ARGUMENT 
A. Account Stated. 
The Grovers advocate that the 1996/1997 statement of account was received and relied 
upon prior to the assignment/assumption, based upon Blair's speculative testimony, wherein he 
testified he received the 1996/1997 statement of account from Gaston in March 1991. This 
statement of account was actually given to Grovers in March 199£, in accordance with Earl's 
standard practice of providing information to the purchaser to assist in preparation of income 
taxes. 7 In their Brief, Grovers assert the parties knew the document [1996/1997 statement of 
account] had been produced at the time of the sale because it was included in the packet of 
documents used at closing.8 As noted on the last line of that document, Earl wrote "PORTER 
GASTON SOLD TO BLAIR GROVER, RIGBY MAY 1, 1997 BAL. DUE ON PRINCIPAL= 
$54,984.23." (R. Vol. 1, p. 12) (emphasis added). "Sold" is a past tense verb, which shows the 
document was made or completed after May I, I 997. 
The term "amortization schedule" is loosely used. An amortization schedule is"[ a] 
schedule of periodic payments of interest and principal owed on a debt obligation; specif., a loan 
7 Appellant's Br. 5, 10-11. 
8 Resp't Br. 23 n.91. 
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schedule showing both the amount of principal and interest that is due at regular intervals over 
the loan term and the remaining unpaid balance after each scheduled payment is made." BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 66 (7th abr. ed. 2000). As discussed at length in Appellant's Brief, the 
handwritten statements are statements of account. An amortization schedule covers the future 
payment breakdown, but a statement of account does not. 
B. Mutual Examination of the Claims. 
Over and over, Grovers allege that Earl was the exclusive "bookkeeper" and "note 
holder." (Resp't Br. 11, 12, 14, 21, 22, 27.) Regardless of the number of times those allegations 
are repeated, Earl had no duty, nor assumed function, to act as Gaston's, and then Grovers' 
bookkeeper. The fact that Earl was a payee under the terms of the Promissory Note did not 
impose any requirement for bookkeeping, nor did this fact provide additional, special, or 
exclusive knowledge of facts necessary to calculate the outstanding balance at any given time. 
Grovers also assert that they "could not have gone to a third party, i.e., a bank, and 
figured out the balance of the Note .... " (Resp't Br. 12.) This assertion is absurd. Blair 
possessed a copy of the Promissory Note. He knew, or could have known, all of the requisite 
terms to determine the outstanding balance ( original balance, interest rate, frequency of 
payments, duration and a historical payment history). Blair admitted he had, in his own law 
office, software to generate amortization schedules. 
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Grovers assert that "[b]oth the original seller and the original buyer agreed to the Note's 
balance." (Resp't Br. 12.) The cited authority for this assertion is Blair's own words and is 
without proper foundation. 
Grovers attempt to persuade the Court to infer that, because two partial year schedules 
were prepared in 1997, there is proof the 1996/1997 statement was prepared in response to 
Blair's inquiry in March 1997. Again, the most logical inference is that these statements were 
prepared in March 1998, in conformity with Earl's practice of providing information to assist the 
purchasers in preparation of income taxes. The reason for two separate statements was because 
other were two different debtors in 1997. Gaston's four months of payments were simply added 
to the 1996 statement. 
Grovers also state "[t]he Wadsworths presented the district court with no evidence 
suggesting that the 1996/1997 amortization schedule was not intended as a definite statement of 
account to Gaston and the Grovers." (Resp't Br. I 4) ( emphasis added). Wadsworths also 
advocate the 1996/1997 schedule was a statement of account. As discussed previously, a 
"statement of account" is not the equivalent of an "account stated." The 1996/1997 schedule was 
not intended to be a final statement, as is required to be an account stated. 
Grovers continue to attempt to transform the requirement of mutual examination into a 
unilateral responsibility, by arguing that Earl did not catch his own error. For the reasons argued 
elsewhere herein, this is error. 
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.. -, . 
C. Mutual Assent. 
Like the requirements of mutual examination, Grovers attempt to transform mutual assent 
into unilateral assent. They argue that Wadsworths' silence, failure to object, etc., to their own 
document(s) shows mutual assent. The cases cited by Grovers for this proposition (Needs v. 
Hebener, 118 Idaho 438,443, 797 P.2d 146, 151 (Ct. App. 1990); Argonaut Ins. Cos. v. Tri-West 
Constr. Co., 107 Idaho 643,646,691 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Ct. App. 1984)), all have the factual 
pattern wherein a creditor sent a statement to a debtor who did not object or remain silent. This 
is factually different from the present case. Grovers attempt to contort MT. Deaton & Co. 
v. Leibrock, 114 Idaho 614,616, 759 P.2d 905,907 (Ct. App. 1988), in which an accounting firm 
provided accounting services for an engineering company, and assert the present case is factually 
similar because "Wadsworths functioned as the accountant for the Note." (Resp't Br. 16.) The 
facts are not similar, nor are the inferences logical. As discussed above, Earl did not have the 
duties of the accountant or bookkeeper. 
An account stated is a manifestation of assent involving two parties, but does not alter the 
original debt. Restatement (Second) Contracts § 282 clarifies the requirements of mutual assent 
under an account stated, which does not operate in the manner held by the District Court. This 
section reads: 
(!) An account stated is a manifestation of assent by debtor and creditor to a 
stated sum as an accurate computation of an amount due the creditor. A 
party's retention without objection for an uureasonable long time of a 
statement of account rendered by the other party is a manifestation of assent. 
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(2) The account stated does not itself discharge any duty but is an admission by 
each party of the facts asserted and a promise by the debtor to pay according to 
its terms. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS§ 282 (emphasis added). 
Comment c to § 282 states that the effect of an account stated operates as an admission 
and a promise to pay. Accounts stated appear to be primarily evidentiary in nature. The District 
Court discussed the "rebuttable presumption" as discussed in the Needs case. As Restatement of 
Contracts shows, accounts stated are premised upon an existing creditor/debtor relationship, 
which, as to Wadsworths and Grovers, did not take place until the time of closing. Grovers 
assumed full responsibility to pay the Promissory Note in accordance with its terms. Now, 
Grovers seek to avoid discharge of their remaining obligation under this Promissory Note. As 
shown by Restatement (Second) Contracts §282(2), accounts stated are not intended to provide 
such relief. 
In discussing the Consent to Assignment and Assumption, and Release (Consent) signed 
by Wadsworths, Grovers argue that the Consent incorporates the Assumption and Assignment 
Agreement, and, for that reason, Wadsworths are bound by the terms of the Assumption and 
Assignment Agreement. (Resp't Br. 16-18.) Grovers' argument culminates in Grovers' 
statement that "[t]hus, the Wadsworths clearly assented to the Grovers' assumption of a Note 
with a $54,984.23 balance." (Resp't Br. 19.) Grovers' claim that Wadsworths were 
contractually bound is flawed. Particularly, as the drafter of the documents, Blair is not allowed 
any leniency in the interpretation and construction of the documents. Blair divided both the 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 7 
Consent and the Assignment and Assumption Agreement into a recital section and an agreement 
section. (R. Vol. I, pp.55-59.) In both documents, Blair used the words "WITNESSETH" and 
"NOW THEREFORE." (R. Vol. 1, pp. 55, 58.) The term "witnesseth" is "usually set in all 
capitals, commonly separates the preliminaries in a contract, up through the recitals, from the 
contractual terms themselves, but modem drafters increasingly avoid it as an antiquarian relic." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1295 (7th abr. ed. 2000). "Therefore" is defined as "[f]or that reason; 
on that ground or those grounds" or "to that end." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1201 (7th abr. ed. 
2000). The reference to the Assumption and Assignment Agreement in the Consent is only 
found in the recital section and is not part of any contractual obligation. Wadsworths are not 
bound by the Assignment and Assumption Agreement. Conversely, Groves are bound by the 
terms of the Promissory Note which they fully assumed. 
D. Mistake is a Defense. 
Grovers assert Earl made only a unilateral mistake and it is therefore not a defense to an 
account stated claim. (Resp't Br. 20-21.) First, there are no mistakes in the Promissory Note or 
other 1990 contractual documents, which clearly state the payment responsibilities. These 
responsibilities were understood by Grovers. (Grover Dep. 36:25-37:9.) The mistake at issue is 
with the interim computations of principal and interest. Grovers argue that only a mutual 
mistake can be the basis of a defense against an account stated, but provide no authority to 
support this argument. (Resp't Br. 21.) A mutual mistake is generally required to modify a 
contract. "A mutual mistake occurs when both parties, at the time of contracting, share a 
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misconception regarding a basic assumption or vital fact upon which the bargain is based." 
Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474,482, 129 P.3d 1223, 1231 (2006). In an account stated, there 
is no such requirement. In Rustlewood Assoc. v. Mason County, 969 P.2d 535 (1999), the 
Washington Court of Appeals specifically held that a unilateral mistake of fact may overcome the 
prima facie evidence established by an account stated. 
In his Decision, Judge Tingey determined there was a unilateral mistake because Earl was 
responsible for the mistake. (R. Vol. 3, p. 252.) A mistake is based upon a misconception, not on 
who is responsible for creating the misconception. 
Although Judge Tingey mentioned Wadsworths' argument regarding Grovers "conscious 
ignorance," and even though it has strong applicability to this case, the District Court never 
discussed conscious ignorance. Grovers cite Restatement (Second) Contracts § 153, which deals 
with unilateral mistake. (Resp't Br. 22.) Judge Tingey referenced Restatements (Second) 
Contracts § 152, which deals with mutual mistakes. Both§§ 152 and 153 refer to Restatements 
(Second) Contracts § 154 as to who bears the risk of a mistake. Section 154 reads: 
A party bears the risk of mistake when 
(a) the risk is allocated to him by agreement of the parties, or 
(b) he is aware, at the time the contract is made, that he has only limited 
knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake relates but treats 
his limited knowledge as sufficient, or 
( c) the risk is allocated to him by the court on the ground that it is reasonable 
in the circumstances to do so. 
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RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS §154 (emphasis added). 
Comment c to§ 154 reads: 
Conscious ignorance. Even though the mistaken party did not agree to bear 
the risk, he may have been aware when he made the contract that his 
knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake relates was 
limited. Ifhe was not only so aware that his knowledge was limited but 
undertook to perform in the face of that awareness, he bears the risk of the 
mistake. It is sometimes said in such a situation that, in a sense, there was 
not a mistake but "conscious ignorance." 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 154. 
Grovers argue they had very limited knowledge, did nothing to investigate, and were 
satisfied with the information they had.9 In his deposition, Blair stated "I don't remember talking 
directly to him [Gaston] at the time of this transaction. After I had this document that he 
represented was Earl's statement of the balance that was owed, I was satisfied with that." 
(Grover Dep. 34:19-22.) Blair was willing to accept the terms of payment, whatever they were. 
Blair testified he did not perform a calculation of the monthly payments and the payment 
obligations, which could have been through 2012. (Grover Dep. 41-42.) 
Grovers assert that "[t]he Wadsworth have cited no authority that states that the contract 
should be reformed under this circumstances." (Resp't Br. 22-23.) This statement implicitly 
references the purported account stated, not the 1990 contract. W adsworths do not seek to 
reform the 1990 contract and related documents. 
9
"Grovers had no knowledge whether there had been prepayments by Jensen, forgiveness, 
off-sets, or other adjustments." (Resp't Br. 23.) Grovers could not have known of a different 
outstanding balance. (Resp't Br. 22.) 
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Grovers request this Court disregard Matthis v. Wendling, 962 P .2d 160 (Wyo. 1988) 
because it is a Wyoming case and is supposedly factually different. Idaho's appellant courts have 
not taken an elitist view of other states' cases in the past, nor would it be prudent to do so now. 
Grovers' make a feeble attempt to distinguish this case on the basis that they were not a party to 
the original transaction and did not have actual knowledge as to whether or not there had been 
any prepayments, forgiveness, offsets, or other adjustments. (Resp't Br. 23.) These attempts to 
distinguish the facts falls short. Factually, Grovers knew that no prepayments were made 
because of Gastons' comments to him about the same being prohibited. The circumstances are 
such that no one could logically infer there were offsets, forgiveness of the obligation, or other 
obligations.10 Grovers are not entitled to renegotiate the transaction with Wadsworths through 
their exclusive dealings with Gaston. Rather, they step into Gaston's and Jensens' position. 
Grovers reference the District Court's finding that "the fmal payment date is not a material 
term of the Note ... [which] is only tangentially related to the ultimate obligation to pay a 
specified amount." (Resp't Br. 24.) Wadsworths agree the final payment date is not material, but 
timely payments are material. Grovers' argument is rooted in the District Court stating that "once 
Grovers became aware of the balance owed and the applicable interest rate, the final payment date 
was of minimal significance." (R. Vol. 3, pp. 252-53.) Such statements and arguments assume 
the formation of a new contract, rather than the correct analysis of looking at the assumption of 
10 These would be affirmative defenses and the party raising the defenses has the burden 
of proof, pursuant to IRCP 8( c ). 
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the existing 1990 contract. "Awareness," orlack thereof, of a person assuming a contract does not 
change or modify the terms of the contract. If that were the case, Grovers were aware of the 
existing terms of the contract, which required the payments to be made as consideration for the 
acquisition of the Northgate property. The District Court's ruling infers only the balance owed is 
relevant at any given time. However, monthly payments by themselves are sufficient 
consideration. Fix v. Fix, 125 Idaho 372,375,870 P.2d 1331, 1334 (Ct. App.1993). 
Grovers boldly, but falsely, state that "[ n Jo one disputes that Grovers are obligated to 
$54,984.23 and did so." (Resp't Br. 24.) Wadsworths do dispute such assertion. Grovers assumed 
liability without reservation for the payments required under the Promissory Note. 
E. Promissory Estoppel. 
Grovers make the absurd argument that Wadsworths are raising their "objection" to the 
application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel for the first time on appeal, which they 
advocate is not possible under an issue preclusion rule. (Resp't Br. 25). To the extent raised as a 
claim by Grovers or as an issue by the District Court, Wadsworths have raised their objection and 
defenses. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 11, 27.)11 
Grovers provides little defense to Judge Tingey's ruling related to promissory estoppel. 
Grovers state "[t]hus, even if the court misapplied the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the 
doctrine of estoppel certainly applies in this case." (Resp't Br. 25 n.96.) Shortly thereafter, 
Grovers state that "[ e ]ven if the Court agrees with the Wadsworths that the district court 
11 Action to Quiet Title ,i 9; Answer ,i 3 and affirmative defenses. 
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improperly granted the Grovers' motion based on promissory estoppel, the Court may still affirm 
the district court upon the correct theory." (Resp 't Br. 30) ( emphasis added). Grovers fail to 
discuss or rebut Wadsworths arguments that promissory estoppel is only a substitute for 
consideration, not a basis for a substituted contract. (Appellant's Br. 21, et. seq.) 
F. Specific Recommendations or Representations. 
Grovers start out their discussion in this section with an incorrect statement that 
Wadsworths represented a balance to Grovers prior to assuming the obligation, which constituted 
a promise. (See discussion above.) Regardless of how many times Grovers repeat this statement, 
it is still incorrect; there is no proof. 
Grovers do not discuss the distinction between a "promise" and a "representation." As 
defined by law, a promise lies in the intent of the parties to act or refrain from acting. In this 
particular instance, the action, which needed to be performed or refrained from being performed, 
was to receive fewer payments and consequently less money than what was promised, pursuant to 
the 1990 contract. Although Earl believed the statement of account (his representation of fact) 
was correct, there is a complete void of evidence to show he intended to accept less than the 
required consideration. 
Grovers make the self-serving argument that "[a]ny reasonable person would have taken 
Earl's representation to be a final and accurate statement of the ultimate obligation under the 
Note." (Resp't Br. 26.) Wadsworths submit that a "reasonable person," knowing he is assuming a 
monthly payment obligation, would concern himself with knowing what his responsibilities would 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 13 
be (i.e., amount and number of monthly payments), rather than just knowing the outstanding 
balance. This concern is heightened by the fact that Blair was an experienced attorney. Although 
Blair avoided admitting it outright, he accepted the written document at face value and believed 
his obligation was to continue to make the payments exactly as outlined in the Promissory Note. 
As established, knowing the outstanding balance was only used to determine the amount of money 
Grovers would pay to the original purchasers. In this case, Blair did not question the payment 
obligation and did not see any inconsistency between the amount he used to calculate the buyout 
to Gaston. Blair even stated his payment obligations may continue longer than what was stated in 
the contract. 12 
G. Wadsworths Could Not Foresee Grovers Reliance. 
Grovers allege Wadsworths "blatantly misrepresented the record to the Court" in their 
assertion that they did not know of Grovers' identity or contract negotiations. (Resp't Br. 26-27.) 
These are strong words with no support. In support of their attack, Grovers present five 
"reasons," discussed as follows: 
12 Grover Dep. 42:1-7. Grovers challenge the use of depositions on appeal. (Resp't Br. 28 
n.104.) The full depositions were presented to the Court as part of Defendant's Second Motion 
for Reconsideration or Motion for Clarification. (R. Vol. 3, pp. 317A-317E.) Wadsworths' 
Second Amended Notice of Appeal (R. Vol. 4, pp. 405-09) contains the appeal from the Court's 
denial of this Motion. For simplicity of argument, granting of summary judgment and denial of 
the Motion for Reconsideration as considered and presented collectively. Using the same 
arguments, many parts of Grovers' arguments and cited support would be inconsistent. To 
support the proposition that Blair had the 1996/1997 statement of account at the time of closing, 
Grovers refer to the Clerk's Record on Appeal, Vol. 2, p. 223, (Resp't Br. 26. n 98) which is the 
document itself. Only by referencing Gaston's deposition could any reference be made to having 
the documents at closing (Gaston Dep. 92). 
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1. "First, Gaston requested the 199611997 amortization schedule from the 
Wadsworths for the express purpose of asserting the balance of the note at the time of the sale 
from Gaston to the Grovers." (Resp't Br. 27.) For supporting authority, Grovers cite Blair's 
deposition. Blair was without any knowledge as to whether or not Gaston ever contacted 
Wadsworths prior to the time of closing when he requested the consent. Gaston and W adsworths 
both deny any contact with each other. (Gaston Dep. 46:19-23, 89:22-90:11; Norma Wadsworth 
Dep. 37:9-21, Sept. 14, 2007.) Even if Blair made the request, the request does not show actual or 
constructive knowledge on Wadsworths' part. 
2. "Second, the 1996/1997 amortization schedule expressly refers to the sale of the 
property to Blair Grover." (Resp't Br. 27) ( emphasis added). This statement is correct on its 
face, but does not support Grovers' attempted use. This statement supports the fact that the 
notation was prepared after closing, not before. The past tense verb "sold" was used. 
3. "Third, the 1996/1997 amortization schedule was included in the documents for the 
sale. " Id ( emphasis added). For support, Grovers refer to the 1996/1997 statement. There is 
nothing on the face of the statement to indicate the document was included in the closing 
documents. Certainly, Blair did not present any proof that the closing documents included the 
1996/1997 statement. 
4. Fourth, the Wadsworths signed a consent prior to the sale closing between the 
Grovers and Gaston. " Id ( emphasis added). This statement is technically correct. However, the 
closing took place on April 30, 1997, the same day the Assumption and Assigument Agreement 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 15 
was signed. Wadsworths were not privy to either the signing of the Assumption and Assignment 
Agreement or the closing. At this time, Wadsworths knew of Grovers' identity and assumption, 
but it was substantively contemporaneous with the assignment and closing. 
5. "The Grovers only agreed to assume the debt as represented by the Wadsworths in 
the amount of$54,984.23. "Id (emphasis added). Such statement is contrary to the document 
Grovers signed, which indicates they assumed the contract in accordance with the terms and 
conditions of the 1990 contract. Grovers have substantial legal difficulties in this matter. First, 
the Assignment and Assumption Agreement did not involve the Wadsworths. Second, pursuant 
to the existing terms, Wadsworths consented only to the substitution of debtors and did not agree 
to accept a lesser amount than what was owed. 1bird, in the Assumption and Assignment 
Agreement, Blair stated he assumed and agreed to be bound by the Note and Deed of Trust, and to 
pay the balance of the Note, in accordance with the terms thereof. 
H. Grovers Reliance, If Any, Was Not Reasonable. 
Grovers argue that Blair being an attorney is irrelevant. (Resp't Br. 28.) This assertion is 
not true. "Evaluation of the reasonableness of a party's reliance must take account of the totality 
of the circumstances, including the nature of the transaction and the relative sophistication of the 
parties." Young v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 127 Idaho 130, 135-136, 898 P.2d 61, 66-67 
(Ct. App.1994). Throughout their Brief, Grovers assert they lacked knowledge of the true 
outstanding balance. "Lack of knowledge can be shown by lack of understanding regarding the 
contract terms arising from the use of inconspicuous print, ambiguous wording, or complex 
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legalistic language, Id.; the lack of opportunity to study the contract and inquire about its terms, 
Id.; or disparity in the sophistication, knowledge, or experience of the parties, Walker v. American 
Cyanamid Co., 130 Idaho 824, 948 P.2d 1123 (1997)." Lavey v. Regence BlueShield of Idaho 139 
Idaho 37, 42, 72 P.3d 877,882 (2003). Blair's legal background is relevant to his alleged 
reliance. 
Blair states his practice as an attorney "was to accept those representations" between the 
parties involved in the transactions he is handling, and therefore shouldn't be responsible for the 
terms of the Promissory Note because Gaston and Wadsworth had come to an agreement as to the 
outstanding balance. This reasoning is flawed and would be a double standard. Blair refuses to 
accept responsibility for documents he prepared and voluntarily signed, yet he advocates 
Wadsworths be held responsible for documents they neither saw or signed. 
Next, Grovers argue the fact that the statements of account are handwritten is irrelevant. 
(Resp't Br. 28-29.) These statements are the basis for Grovers' claim of reliance. Blair was 
familiar with amortization schedules, prepared them, and had them prepared. If, as he alleges, he 
didn't trust the computer generated amortized schedules, a fortiori, he shouldn't trust the hand 
written calculations of a stranger as represented by another stranger ( assuming such representation 
was made). 
I. Doctrine of Estoppel. 
Grovers refer to the "doctrine of estoppel" as "the correct theory" (Resp't Br. 30), but fail 
to define the doctrine. Apparently, Grovers believe this doctrine is different from promissory 
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estoppel. Black's Law Dictionary does not define "doctrine of estoppel." Idaho Courts have used 
doctrine of estoppel to refer to insurance contract disputes, Shoup v. Union Sec. Life Ins. Co., 142 
Idaho 152, 154, 124 P.3d 1028, 1030 (2005); induced reliance, Gafford v. State, 127 Idaho 472, 
477,903 P.2d 61, 66 (1995); equitable estoppel, City ofSandpointv. Sandpoint Indep. Highway 
Dist., 126 Idaho 145,151,879 P.2d 1078, 1084 (1994); judicial estoppel, etc. Probably 
intentionally, Grovers do not define or list the elements of doctrine of estoppel, nor do they cite 
any case that would definitely refer to a particular type of estoppel. The only hint is found in 
Grovers' statement that "[t]he doctrine of estoppel should prevent the Wadsworths from taking a 
position opposite of their previous position that the $54,984.23 balance was correct." (Resp't 
Br. 30.) Typically, this argument refers to equitable estoppel. Equitable estoppel is not applicable 
to the present case because: (1) Wadsworths did not intentionally misrepresent or conceal a 
material fact with actual or constructive knowledge of the truth, (2) Grovers had the ability to 
know the truth, (3) any representation as to the amount owed was not made with the intent it be 
relied on, and ( 4) as proved herein, Grovers did not rely upon the representation to determine what 
they would pay Wadsworths in the future. Also, there would not be a "manifest injustice" in light 
of Blair's indolence and state of mind, wherein he thought the outstanding balance was consistent 
with the number of remaining payments. Christensen v. City of Pocatello, I 42 Idaho 132, 124 
P.3d 1008 (2005). 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
A. Commercial Transaction. 
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Grovers assert Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 152 P.3d 594 (2007) 
supports their position, that a commercial transaction took place in the present case. The present 
case is very dissimilar. In Blimka, the number of jeans caused the matter to be deemed a 
commercial transaction because the amount proved the jeans could only be inventory and not for 
personal use. Although land could also be classified as inventory, this is not the case herein. 
The nature of this case was to quiet title, which Wadsworths discussed, in the Appellant's 
Brief, with supportive authorities showing this case to be a commercial transaction. Grovers did 
not refute or discuss these cases in their Brief. (See Appellant's Br. 24, et. seq). 
B. Blair Grover's Status as Member of the Law Firm Prohibits Attorney Fees. 
Ironically, a few sentences after arguing the commercial nature of the transaction, Grovers 
argue that "[t)he subject matter is exclusively personal to the Grovers in their individual capacity . 
. . . " (Resp't Br. 34.) Grovers assert they regularly paid Beard, St. Clair, Gaffney, P.A., which 
demonstrates the precise relationship. No citation is given, nor can Wadsworths find any 
reference in the record, that would show actual payments were made or that funds were not paid 
back to Grovers were not given any profits, dividends, or other compensation from the firm. In 
Swanson & Setzke, Chtd. v. Henning, 116 Idaho 199, 774 P.2d 909 (Ct. App. 1989), the reasoning 
was based upon sound policy to have a detached and objective perspective. The small differences 
in fact, as advocated by Grovers, do not change this overall policy. The policy the Court should 
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follow is that if, and only if, a law firm or attorney obtains representation from a disinterested law 
firm or attorney, should attorney fees be considered. 
C. Attorney Fees Against Norma Wadsworth. 
Grovers appear to infer that Norma instigated this action. Grovers brought Norma into 
this case, both individually and as the Personal Representative of Earl Wadsworth's Estate, by 
their Action to Quiet Title. Norma was a signatory to the various contract documents and a 
beneficiary under the Deed of Trust, as well as a payee under the Note. However, these were not 
the basis upon which Judge Tingey ruled. Judge Tingey ruled on the quiet title action and Earl's 
actions, not the 1990 contract. 
D. Denial of Summary Judgment to Wadsworths. 
The Idaho appellate courts have held that an order denying summary judgment is not 
reviewable on appeal by itself. The rationale is stated in Garcia v. Windley, 144 Idaho 539, 164 
P.3d 819 (2007), as follows: 
By entering an order denying summary judgment, the trial court merely 
indicates the matter should proceed to trial on its merits. The final 
judgment in a case can be tested upon the record made at trial, not on the 
record made at the time summary judgment was denied. Any legal rulings 
made by the trial court affecting the final judgment can be reviewed at that 
time in light of the full record. This will prevent a litigant who loses a case 
after a full and fair trial from having an appellant court go back to the time 
when the litigant had moved for summary judgment to review the relative 
strengths of the witnesses of the litigants at that earlier stage. Were we to 
hold otherwise, one who has sustained his position after a fair hearing of 
the whole case may nevertheless lose because he has failed to prove his 
case fully on the interlocutory motion. 
Garcia v. Windley, 164 P.2d at 822 (emphasis omitted). 
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The denial of summary judgment herein is neither an isolated interlocutory order nor an 
appeal taken after trial. Under the present circumstances on appeal, the denial of a summary 
judgment should be on equal footing with granting summary judgment. In the alternative, the 
Court has the authority to make specific directions to the District Court on remand. Recently, in 
Steedv. Grant Teton Counsel of the Boy Scouts of Am., 144 Idaho 848, 172 P.3d 1123 (2007), the 
Idaho Supreme Court so held. In Kenneth F. White Chtd v. St. Alphonsus Reg 'l Med. Ctr., 136 
Idaho 238, 31 P.3d 926 (2001), the Idaho Court of Appeals specifically reversed granting 
summary judgment and remanded the case back to the district court for entry of judgment in favor 
of St. Alphonsus, the party whose motion of summary judgment was denied. See also Roles v. 
Townsend, 138 Idaho 412, 64 P.3d 338 (Ct. App. 2003); Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho 767, 133 
P.3d 1232 (2006). 
CONCLUSION 
A basic tenet of contract law is to determine and enforce the mutual intent of the parties, 
which is also referred to as mutual assent or the meeting of the minds. In the present case, all 
parties believed and intended the monthly payments would continue as outlined in the Promissory 
Note. Grovers accepted the Promissory Note and other contract documents at face value, and 
even stated the payments may continue beyond the scheduled pay-off date. Unfortunately, when 
Grovers were informed they unknowingly paid Gaston and Jensen $13,000.00 more than they 
were obligated to pay them for their equity in the Northgate property, Grovers, even though 
Gaston was willing to pay Grovers one-half of the overpayment, refused to accept the money. 
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Instead Grovers seek to avoid paying Wadsworths future payments of more than $40,000.00, 
pursuant to a written and unambiguous Promissory Note. Wadsworths were not privy to either the 
negotiations or the terms of assumption arrived at by Grovers and Gaston. Any information 
provided by Earl was conveyed in good faith, but nevertheless inaccurate. 
The District Court erred as discussed. This case should be reversed as to summary 
judgment for Grovers and remanded to the District Court for entry of judgment in favor of 
Wadsworths. 
DATED: April ;J_f2, 2008. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
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